Abstract-In this paper, we present a new paradigm of game (that is, the sum of the payoffs of the two players is searching optimal strategies in the game of Iterated Prisoner's not always a constant), and hence there is no single universal Dilemma using multiple objective evolutionary algorithms. This strategy which will work for all game plays for a player. In a method is better than the existing approaches, because it not strtegymwhich wor forall gam e fo per. In a only gives strategies which perform better in the iterated game, one-shot game, both the players will choose to Defect (D, D), but also gives a family of non-dominated strategies, which can because this move is guaranteed to maximize the payoff of the be analyzed to see what properties a strategy should have to player no matter what his opponent chooses. However, it can win in the game. We present the results obtained with this new be seen that both players would have been better off choosing method, and also the common pattern emerging from the set of to cooperate with each other (hence the dilemma). non-dominated strategies so obtained.
I. INTRODUCTION strategy. Nash [5] proved that any n-player game has a Nash
The prisoner's dilemma is a well known game that has been Equilibrium, when randomization in choosing the moves is extensively studied in economics, political science, machine permitted. However, as it is clear from the prisoner's dilemma learning [1] , [2] and evolutionary biology [3] . In Figure . iterations beforehand, then it is possible to have an equilibrium which is better than (D, D). The equilibrium outcomes in iterated games are defined by folk theorems [6] . For experts alike. Axelrod was the first to study this problem in detail [7] , [1] , [8] . He used single-objective evolutionary When both players cooperate, they are awarded at an algorithm for finding the optimal strategies. This is discussed equal but intermediate level (the reward, R). When only one in section 2. Since Axelrod, there have been several studies player defects, he receives the highest possible payoff (the on this problem [91, [10, [111, [12] , [13] . temptation, T) while the other player gets the sucker's payoff However, in all these studies, the problem of finding optimal (the sucker, S). When both the players defect, they receive strategies has been viewed as a single-objective problem. That and intermediate penalty (the penalty, P).
is, the objective is to find strategies which maximize their own Several interesting properties of the game can be imme-score in a round robin tournament. In this paper, we present diately observed. It can be seen that this is a non-zero sum a new approach of finding optimal strategies by considering the problem as a multiple objective optimization problem: maximizing self-score and minimizing opponent score. Such an approach has not been previously investigated in literature Say, previou, thre ovE es before. We discuss this approach in detail in section 3, the This strategy cooperates on the first move, and then simply for iit±ime copies the opponent's last move in it's subsequent move. That
Outcome: (C) or Cooperate such a simple strategy turned out to be the winner was quite surprising, and Axelrod set out to find other simple strategies with the same or greater power. Axelrod adopted a simple but Fig. 2 . Encoding a strategy for IPD. elegant way for encoding strategies [1] , and then used singleobjective evolutionary algorithm to obtain optimal strategies. strategies that not only performed quite well, but also beat the The encoding scheme is described in detail here. sraly perfor med quitegy, butio earlie For each move in the game, there are four possibilities: both overall performance of 'Tit for Tat' strategy mentioned earlier the players can cooperate (CC or R for reward), the other In this work, the encoding scheme is the same as that player can defect (CD or S for sucker), the first player can mentioned above. However, in addition to a single-objective defect (DC or T for temptation), or both the players can defect EA, we use a Multiple Objective Evolutionary Algorithm (DD or P for penalty). To code the particular strategy, the (MOEA) to optimize the strategy. The two objectives choparticular behavioral sequence is coded as a three letter string. sen are: (i) maximizing the self-score and (ii) minimizing For example, RRR would represent the sequence where both the opponent's score. Here the opponent's score means the the players cooperated over the previous three moves and SSP cumulative score the opponents scored when playing against would represent the sequence where the first player was played a particular strategy. for a sucker twice, and then finally defected. This three letter 1II. USING MULTIPLE OBJECTIVE EVOLUTIONARY sequence is then used to generate a number between 0 and 63, ALGORITHMS by interpreting it as a number in base 4. One such possible way is to assign a digit value to each of the characters in following Most studies of IPD considered a single-objective of maxway: CC = R = 0, DC = T = 1, CD = S = 2 and imizing a player's own score. In this paper, for the first time, DD = P = 3. In this way, RRR would decode to 0, and SSP we treat the problem as a bi-objective optimization problem will decode to 43. Using this scheme, a particular strategy can of maximizing the player's own score and simultaneously be defined as a 64-bit binary string of C's (cooperate) and D's minimize opponent's score.
(defect) where the ith C or D corresponds to the ith behavioral sequence. Figure 2 shows such an example GA string. For the A. Why multiple objective evolutionary algorithm? example string in the figure, the three-letter code comes to
The original formulation of the prisoner's dilemma game be RTR for the previous moves (given in the figure). This looks like a single-objective problem, that is, to find a strategy decodes to 4, thereby meaning that player I should play the which maximizes a player's self-score. However, this problem (4+1) or 5-th move specified in the first 64-bit GA string. In can also be looked as a multiple objective optimization probthis case, the fifth bit is C, meaning that the player I will lem. It is possible to win the game by not only maximizing the cooperate.
self-score, but also by minimizing the opponent's score. Since Since a particular move depends on the previous three the prisoner's dilemma game is a non-zero sum game, it is moves, so the first three moves in a game are undefined in possible that there is a trade-off between these two objectives the above scheme. To account for these six bits (C's and D's, (we will later show that this is actually the case), and therefore initially assigned at random) are appended to the above 64 bit using a multiple objective evolutionary algorithm may actually string to specify a strategy's premises, or assumption about the give a better insight to the optimal strategies of playing the pre-game behavior. Together, each of the 70 bit strings thus game as compared to a single-objective formulation. This is represent a particular strategy, the first 64 for rules and the because using multiple conflicting objectives, not one but a next 6 for the premises.
number of trade-off optimal solutions can be found. These Axelrod used the above encoding scheme to find optimal non-dominated trade-off solutions so obtained can then be strategies using a single-objective genetic algorithm. He found analyzed to look for any pattern or insights about optimal that from a random start, the genetic algorithm discovered strategies for the IPD. If any such patterns are discovered, they would provide a blue-print in formulating optimal strategies for the game.
4O B. The NSGA-II algorithm
For multiple objective optimization, we use the NSGA-II algorithm given by Deb et al. [14] . NSGA-II has been suc- 4 cessfully applied to many other multiple objective optimization J problems [15] as well.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND TEST CASES
3.| Both single-objective EA and MOEA were used for getting l optimal strategies. The simulation for both the algorithms followed these steps. In each generation, a certain number of 320_I strategies were generated, and each strategy was made to play°50 IS 200 against 16 other players. Each game consisted of 150 moves. Fig. 3 . Plot of the mean fitness (shown in solid line) and maximum fitness Then the strategies were sorted in the decreasing order of their (shown in dotted line) of population when self-score is maximized. cumulative scores, and the next generation was created using a recombination operator. The payoff matrix was the same as shown in Figure 1 . The details of 16 other players in the fray have been given in the appendix. These strategies have been 40
used extensively in previous studies on IPD. Clearly, in one particular game, a player can score a max-3W imum of 750 (if he always defects, and the opponent always cooperates), and a minimum of 0 (if he always cooperates, 3 while the opponent always cooperates). None of these two 2- extremes are achieved in practice. According to Dawkins [3] , a more useful measure of a strategy is how close it comes to 2 the benchmark score, which is the score a player will have if both the players always cooperate. In this case, the benchmark ISO score is 450. For example if the score of a player, averaged over all the players he played, is 400, then he has scored 89% I . , of the benchmark score. This is a more useful way of denoting G_ow502C the score of a player, since it is independent of the particular payoff matrix used, as well as the number of players against Fig. 4 . Plot of the mean fitness (shown in solid line) and minimum fitness which the player played. In all the results presented in the next (shown in dotted line line) of population when opponent score is minimized. section, we will refer only to the average score of a player in a game, or the score as a percentage of the benchmark score. (score the opponent had when playing against this player), which is minimized.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
As is clear from the graphs, in the first case the mean fitness Now, we present and analyze the results obtained by NSGA-increases steadily, and after 200 generations the maximum II. Since solutions are represented using a bit-string, we self-score of all of a sample in the population is 441, which is have used a single-point crossover operator and a bit-wise 97% of the benchmark score. When the EA is run for longer mutation operator. In all simulations, we have used a crossover generations, the maximum fitness converges at 442 and does probability of 1/70 and mutation probability of 1/140. not increase further. When these optimal strategies are fielded in a round robin tournament, these strategies win with a big A. Results obtained using single-objective EA margin. Tables I and 2 show the outcome (average of 20 The single-objective EA used is the same as used by runs) of two tournaments. In the first tournament, there are 16 Axelrod [1] . Two runs of single-objective EA were done. One, strategies and 'Tit for Tat' is the winner with an average score in which the self-score of the player was maximized, and the of 387. In the second tournament, when the single-objective other in which the opponent's score was minimized. For each optimal strategy is fielded, it wins by a huge margin, scoring of the runs, the population size was fixed at 40. The results as high as upto 97% of the benchmark score. This is in line obtained when the EA is run for 200 generations are shown with the results obtained by Axelrod. We refer to the strategy in Figure 3 obtained by maximizing the self-score as "Strategy SO". For maximizing the self-score, the fitness measure of a samWhen the opponent score is minimized, the minimum fitness ple is its self-score, hence the fitness score is to be maximized, stabilizes at 112. The strategies so obtained perform poorly in while in the second score the fitness is the opponent score a round robin tournament (their performance is quite similar 14244-0464-9/06/$20.00 2006 IEEE. show the results of a typical simulation run. 1) Evolution of optimal strategies: Starting from a purely Fig. 5 . The initial random solution (shown with '+') and the non-dominated random distribution, the strategies ultimately converged to the front(shown in 'x'), when NSGA-11 is run for 20000 generations.
Pareto-optimal front. This is shown in Figure 5 . It shows that
The most significant outcome of the MOEA, is however, the MOEA is indeed successfully able to search the solution evolution of strategies which perform much better that objective EA, 442) had a mean opponent score (214) that was Spiteful 368 significantly lower than that for the single-objective optimal Naive Prober 362 strategy (244). Figure 6 shows the single-objective optimum outperformed other strategies in a round robin tournament Periodic Player CD 320 (see Table 4 and Table 5 ), but also defeated the Strategy Periodic Player CCD 320
Hard Majority 307 SO (Table 5 ). This clearly shows that MOEA is able to find Random Player -307-__9_6
better strategies as compared to the single-objective EA. Since Always Defect 288 an MOEA maintains a good diverse population due to the Periodic Player DDC 286 consideration of two conflicting objectives, the search power of MOEA is usually better than that in a single-objective EA. In complex optimization problems in which the search of the shows the combined plot for six Pareto-optimal strategies individual optimal solution is difficult using a single-objective (chosen from Figure 6 ), and for six random strategies (for optimization algorithm, a two or more objective consideration comparison). may lead to a better optimum.
In the plot, the frequency distribution for six Pareto-optimal The other extreme solution on the Pareto-optimal front is strategies are given in the lower half (with self-score decreasthe same as obtained by minimizing the opponent's score, and ing along the y-axis), and for six randomly chosen random has the same performance as the Always Defect strategy. Even strings in the upper half. The cooperative moves are shown though a many of the bit-positions in the strategy string for in white boxes, and the defecting moves are shown in black this strategy are C, it behaves almost like the Always Defect boxes. Only those bit positions which were used more than strategy, as is discussed later.
20 times in the round-robin tournament are shown. The plot 2) Relationship among the Pareto-optimal strategies: The reveals that only a few of the bit positions of a strategy are fact that a non-dominated front is obtained by using MOEA used more than 20 times. Also, the Pareto-optimal strategies indicates that the strategies lying on this front must have some-show some interesting similarities with respect to the usage thing in common. As such, different Pareto-optimal strategies of a particular bit position. For example, positions 0, 1, 4, look quite different from each other. To have a closer look at 5, 17, 18, 21, and 55 turn out to be 'Defecting' in all of these strategies, during the game, the number of times each bit the six Pareto-optimal solutions. There are also some trends position in the string was used in a round-robin tournament in 'Cooperating', coming out as common strategies of these was recorded, and plotted for different strategies. Figure 7 high-performing solutions. We discuss a few of them in the We further observe that the strategies lying on the non-minimized (maximum opponent score is represented by 'X' and corresponding average score is represented by diamonds) against the Pareto-optimal front dominated front share some common properties. This can give obtained earlier (shown in circles).
us valuable insight about the optimal strategies for a round robin toumament. It will be interesting to make some prototype will find further application in related game-playing problems strategies using these common features and observing their in the near future. performance in a tournament; we leave this for a future research work.
